I. Background

I.1 Early Days

After a liberation struggle lasting almost two decades, Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980. Salient features of the Zimbabwean independence Constitution were the result of negotiations culminating in the Lancaster House Agreement.

Zimbabwe was welcomed into the commonwealth of independent states, with widespread euphoria forecasting expectations for South Africa, shackled at that time by the injustices of apartheid. This degree of buoyancy was duly reflected in economic performance in the early post-independence days and the struggle leading to the formation of the unity government did little to dispel optimism.

Government strategies focused on reducing poverty and reversing social and economic inequality by improving rural infrastructure, immunization, universal primary school enrolment and land reform\(^1\), reinforced by its commitment to achieve sustainable political stability. This was quite understandable as the country was divided into a largely poor rural population, approximately 80 per cent of the labour force, and a well endowed and privileged expatriate and settler community, mainly from Britain.

Government policies were widely applauded as investment in human capital yielded positive results with infant mortality, adult literacy and school enrolment rates surpassing those of many other developing countries. The share of GDP expenditure in both health and education was significantly higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Black

\(^1\) Growth with Equity Strategy (1981); Zimbabwe National Transitional Plan (1982-85); First Five-Year National Development Plan (1982-85)
participation in the economy increased greatly as did their skills and experience, resulting in improved national capacity to address both economic and social challenges.²

I.2 Land and Reforms

Large-scale commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares of the best land in the country, while 8,500 small-scale farmers, indigenous Zimbabweans, owned 1.4 million hectares or 5 per cent of agricultural land. Acquisition and reform of land ownership the cause célèbre of the liberation struggle for self-determination and equality, has been, and in some respects, still remains a major impediment to normalizing relations with a segment of the society and the donor community.

A UNDP report recently observed that “the decades-old tension between settlers and indigenous population dominated the political dynamics of independent Zimbabwe which took the form of balancing two contradictory elements: the need to protect the economic structures dominated by the minority and the establishment and consolidation of political control to govern effectively”³.

A 1989 Civil Service Review Commission triggered by concerns of the Public Service Commission, pointed to several negative factors that were adversely affecting the efficiency and effectiveness of the civil service; lack of direction, leadership and supervision, lack of measurable targets/standards, poor work ethic, duplication, lack of control of resources, high staff turnover, poor decision-making and the need to redefine the focus of government, were among the most prominent.

The reform programme adopted by Government to combat the identified deficiencies was a mark of political determination and maturity. Aiming to improve the quality of services and the capacity to deliver⁴, Government acknowledged that an efficient civil service was the guarantor of transparency and political accountability, while sustaining a reliable and equitable legal framework. Client Charters were introduced, restructuring and reduction in the size of the service was addressed, competitive remuneration packages were reviewed, greater emphasis was placed on performance appraisal, job evaluation, manpower planning and training, as well as outsourcing

² Zimbabwe UN Common Country Assessment (undated)
⁴ Zimbabwe UN Common Country Assessment (Undated)
and commercialization of some departments, introduction of expenditure monitoring and control computerized systems, and mainstreaming of gender issues. Appropriate institutional arrangements were put in place to ensure proper oversight and coordination.

The decade of the nineties brought a reversal of economic fortunes that severely challenged national capacities and despite a number of policy interventions poverty was reported on the increase. The effects of two droughts in 1991-92 and 1994-95, floods in 2000, the mushrooming of the HIV epidemic, 21 per cent of the population estimated as infected and the failure of land acquisition based on “willing seller-willing buyer”, initial compensation by the British Government and transfer of some land to Zimbabwean elites, the reality of land ownership in the country remained unchanged and divisive.

Unrest among some Zimbabweans whose expectations were as yet unmet, violence against some white farmers whose lands were forcibly occupied, Government introduction of the “fast track” acquisition, albeit legally as contained in the 1992 Land Acquisition Act, led to confrontational rather than consultative politics, tarnishing the country’s image at home and abroad, worsened by the withdrawal of donor support and the imposition of sanctions in 2002.

Agriculture, the mainstay of Zimbabwe’s economy, declined sharply; many new land owners lacked capacity, agricultural inputs were in short supply, some white commercial farmers chose to leave the country, unemployment increased, foreign exchange became scarce and food reserves shrunk, resulting in an increase in rural poverty.

Responding to an agreement between the GOZ and a Committee of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers meeting in Abuja, Nigeria in September 2001, UNDP in concert with the with the World Bank, the European Commission and the Commonwealth Secretariat, undertook a mission and produced a report on the a way forward, but this was overtaken by elections in a politically charged atmosphere.

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5 Ministry of Women’s Affairs Gender and Community Development established in April 2005
6 Zimbabwe Millennium Development Goals (2004) reported that extreme poverty increased significantly during the 1990s, an estimated 35 per cent of households living below the poverty line in 1995 compared with 26 per cent in 1990. Based on the total consumption poverty line, households in poverty increased from around 40 per cent in the late 1980s to 62 per cent by 1995-96
UNDP has been a solid partner with the Government of Zimbabwe since independence demonstrating flexibility with regard to the evolving development challenges of a recently independent country emerging from a liberation struggle. Responding to Government priorities UNDP has focused on poverty reduction, environmental sustainability and development management, aimed at strengthening national capacity to address development challenges of a newly independent country. In time, dictated by new imperatives, emphasis has shifted to focus on governance, gender and HIV/AIDS, within framework for poverty reduction. It is in this context that Zimbabwe, one of the signatories of the Millennium Declaration in September 2000, adopted as its main MDGs the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger, promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases.

Economic decline and donor unresponsiveness have affected resource availability including expectations of the UN development system. As a neutral and reliable partner the UN system underwent a rigorous self-evaluation that examined individual agency as well as overall system capacity to cope with the new circumstances in Zimbabwe and through a set of thematic groups (UNDP, UNFPA, UNESCO, UNICEF, ILO and the World Bank), along with Government ministries, reviewed priorities including economic revival and poverty reduction, land and environment, governance and human rights, population and basic services, HIV/AIDS and gender. The purpose of the exercise was essentially to determine the UN systems’ capacity to address the needs of the country and to coordinate mobilization of resources.

I.3 Policy Options

Government ability to sustain support for social development priorities presented major challenges in the search for appropriate policy initiatives that would achieve economic stabilization and recovery. Strained relations with traditional donor partners exacerbated resource constraints. The IMF supported Economic Structural Adjustment

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Programme (ESAP) launched in 1991, within the framework of the Second Five-Year National Development Plan (1991-95), registered benefits in trade liberalization and domestic deregulation but had a further negative impact on the social sector. Increased fiscal deficits, creeping inflation and Government indebtedness resulted in the diversion of expenditure from basic services and social infrastructure development, the net effect being a decline in per capita health expenditure of 50 per cent and in education 32 per cent, between 1990 and 1995.

In 1998 the Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST), a successor to ESAP, sought to achieve economic growth and social development with equity but was starved for resources and therefore failed to gain traction. The Millennium Economic Recovery Programme (MERP) launched in 2001 and the National Economic Revival Programme (NERP), two years later in 2003, both commendable in intent, was of limited impact navigating in an uncoordinated and somewhat turbulent policy environment without resource improvements.

Vision 2020 sought to provide a long-term perspective, capturing the aspirations of all citizens on the basis of an all-encompassing consultative process. The impediments to growth were identified as a lack of transparency, accountability and commitment to openness in the Government, private sector and civil society operations, contributing to corruption and acting as a deterrent on governance. Increasing levels of ethnicity and the decline in religious, moral and cultural values threatened political stability and the attainment of economic diversification and high growth were stymied by weak policy formulation and a lack of macro-economic stability. Vision 2020 held out the promise of overcoming earlier deficiencies in planning and programme frameworks by providing a deeply rooted, consensual long-term perspective⁹, remains credible almost twenty years after its launch.

The GOZ has more recently embarked upon a “Look East Policy” that is expected to generate new friends and new investment opportunities. Within this context the Results Based Management (RBM) is being explored as a new development tool that has borne positive results in other countries and is viewed with great expectations for Zimbabwe.

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II. The Mission

II.1 Planting/Sowing the Seed for Results Based Management

In seeking to ensure greater policy coherence, GOZ introduced an umbrella policy management and coordination initiative within the Office of the President in 1997. Supported by UNDP with a technical assistance project (Policy Coordination and Monitoring Initiative-ZIM/97/01/99), this initiative was designed to assist in strengthening human and institutional capacity in the Monitoring and Implementation Department (MID), of OPC. The MID was made responsible for macro-policy reform, coordination and monitoring, to ensure policy coherence. In addition, alternative processes and procedures to facilitate open national policy consultation and dialogue between Government, private sector, civil society organizations as well as other stakeholders, were to be explored.

A Malaysian Consultant engaged to evaluate the programme identified major shortcomings notably, an inadequate performance management system, absence of an integrated monitoring and evaluation system, unclear roles and responsibilities among agencies, inadequate inter-agency programme coordination, absence of a human resources development plan, inadequate linkages between the budgetary process and expenditure management processes, and lack of clarity in administrative rules and regulations that would enhance integrated performance in the civil service.

The Consultant recommended the adoption of a holistic programme designed to improve critical support systems, creating an enabling environment as well as capacity-building for policy planning, formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and information management covering all critical agencies and levels.

In an environment characterized by perpetual shortage of resources, the proposed three-year renewable programme was designed to ensure that the various Government agencies achieved their mandated macro and micro-level results in a more coordinated, systematic, integrated, and cost effective manner.

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19 NDP/OPC-MID, Zimbabwe, ZIM/97/010/01/99, Technical Assistance for the Policy Coordination and Monitoring Initiative
21 Ibid
would focus on government-wide systemic reforms and capacity building, with activities strategically linked, integrated and directed in support of all other Government and donor funded programmes, avoiding duplication of effort and resources. The Consultant mission also suggested that the programme should encompass a Performance Management System (PMS), Monitoring & Evaluation System, Human Resources Development and institutional/organizational revamping. In effect, the mission recommended the features of an RBM approach, that were accepted by the Government and UNDP support was sought.

II.2 RBM Preparatory Assistance Program (PAP)

Malaysia’s 1997 financial turn-around was viewed as having value in charting Zimbabwe’s course of action from its current economic crisis. The GOZ and UNDP agreed to run a one-year Preparatory Assistance Program from January to December 2005, utilizing the services of the same Malaysian consulting firm ARTD, that was knowledgeable regarding Zimbabwean public sector reforms and RBM.

II.3 Terms of reference

Before embarking upon a full-fledged RBM exercise the GOZ requested that UNDP contract a team of independent consultants to review the PAP experience. Initially, the Terms of Reference (ToR) was prepared for a thirty-day assignment to be undertaken by three consultants (Annex 1). The duration of the mission was subsequently modified to twenty-one days and only two consultants were contracted.

The first five days of the review mission (RM) were devoted to a desk study of relevant documents and exploratory interviews and discussions. The mission identified key issues that UNDP and Government of Zimbabwe expected to be covered. The mission then presented a modified list of tasks that has been agreed with by both UNDP and Government and this is set out hereunder:

1. Review relevant documentation generated from different sources over the two decades of GOZ implementation of civil service reform (CSR);
2. Interview relevant stakeholders from Government, civil society and donor entities involved with civil service reform since the 1980s;

3. Review development challenges faced by GOZ that civil service reforms were designed to address taking into account the objectives, outputs and outcomes as well as institutional arrangements and processes critical for successful implementation;

4. Document achievements and challenges, for example with respect to improved efficiencies, quality performance, decision-making in terms of macroeconomic management, fiscal balances and employment, against stated objectives and indicators;

5. Review historical support to CSR provided by UNDP and the donor community in terms of sustained and coordinated resource flows within the 1980-2005 period;

6. Review various phases of CSR implementation paying attention to shifts in policy to meet development challenges leading to the adoption of Results Based Management (RBM);

7. Identify economic, political and social environment that necessitated the introduction of a comprehensive, holistic and integrated strategy based on the four pillars of Results Based Budgeting, Personnel Performance, Information Management and Monitoring and Evaluation;

8. Review arrangements and strategies reflected in the RBM Preparatory Assistance Programme (PAP), reaffirming the conceptual and institutional validity of RBM that demonstrates the potential to overcome previously encountered developmental challenges in GOZ ongoing reform process; and

9. Prepare a report for UNDP and the GOZ that documents developments to date; including lessons learned that would assist GOZ with the support of UNDP and other donors in moving the process forward.

III. Introduction of Results Based Management (RBM)

III.1 Economic Environment

IMF analysis in 2005 called for a comprehensive package of structural reforms and restoration of relations with the international community
needed to stabilize the economy and set the path for growth. Pointing to the decline in GDP by 30 per cent from 1997 to 2003 and hyperinflation, in part caused by the collapse of agriculture from the “fast track” land reform, reduced exports and scarce foreign exchange, restrictions on imports, accumulation of external arrears, shortages of food, fuel and electricity became pervasive. The impact in human terms are equally dramatic with an accelerated brain drain, high unemployment, infection rate of the HIV/AIDS pandemic reaching 25 per cent of the adult population, accompanied by a decline in life expectancy and a sharp increase in child mortality.\textsuperscript{13}

During his mission in December 2005, the Senior Economic Adviser from Malaysia commended the GOZ on a number of positive measures already taken but also counseled that a comprehensive package of measures for macro-economic stabilization and structural transformation was urgently needed, stressing that the “business as usual piecemeal disjointed approach” would not yield the desired results and the “gap between intention and implementation” must be overcome.\textsuperscript{14}

In March 2006, the Ministry of Economic Development (MOED) launched the National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEPDD), modeled on the Malaysian experience. The NEPDD pointed out that causes of the crisis faced by Zimbabwe were only partly due to international sanctions, but also to the lack of consensus and shared national vision among stakeholders. It was further asserted that the “business as usual” approach could no longer apply as quick win strategies were needed to stabilize the economy in a six to nine month period. Among the approaches advocated by the Ministry was for “consultation with all key stakeholders, including the private sector, and a holistic and comprehensive macro-economic stabilization programme to reverse the economic decline”.\textsuperscript{15}

Several factors accounted for the decline, according to the MOED, most notably, “contraction in national output, persistent hyperinflation, high unemployment, increasing poverty levels, acute shortages of foreign currency and leakages of foreign exchange, food shortages and price distortions”. These unfavourable conditions are exacerbated by

\textsuperscript{13} IMF Staff Report for the 2005 Article IV Consultation (July 29, 2005). Trading in the informal sector suggests that the inflation rate at this time is upwards of 1000 per cent

\textsuperscript{14} Report to the Government of Zimbabwe on Strengthening Economic Recovery by Dr. K. Govindan December 2005

\textsuperscript{15} Zimbabwe National Security Council-National Economic Development Priority Programme prepared by the Ministry of Economic Development March 2006
“high fiscal deficits, unstable energy supplies, low saving levels and investments, deteriorating infrastructure, external payment arrears, under-performing public enterprises and local authorities, lethargy and bureaucracy in Government, high negative perceptions of the country and international economic sanctions, the brain drain, lack of commitment to act with urgency, of effective policy coordination, of an over-arching monitoring mechanism, mistrust within Government, between public and private sectors, and the absence of a shared national vision among stakeholders”\textsuperscript{15}.

To tackle the current decline the Government introduced significant institutional changes by establishing the National Security Council (NSC) with the President as the Chairperson, the National Economic Recovery Council (NERC) chaired by the Vice-President and a Technical Committee (TC) supporting both, chaired by the Chief Secretary.

NEPDD is generally accorded as providing a platform for Government introducing a new culture of accountability, targeting corruption, indiscipline, speculation and bureaucratic inertia, by strengthening oversight and law enforcement. With the adoption of Performance Budgeting by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and the accompanying work planning and performance agreements by line ministries, greater transparency and discipline become features to contain fiscal deficits, unbudgeted expenditures and contribute to containing inflationary movements. A call by the Reserve Bank to bring closure to the negative factors of the Land Reform Programme, restoring agricultural output as the engine of growth and holding farmers accountable once market determined financing of land and inputs is available, would also contribute to notching inflation down. Government, business and labour in a Social Contract and the encouraging of a dialogue initiated by ecumenical leaders that eventually incorporates other stakeholders, certainly points in a positive direction to bringing Zimbabweans together around a shared vision\textsuperscript{16}.

Although the Malaysian model has value, the GOZ intends to customize the RBM and related strategies to reflect Zimbabwean realities. It fully realizes that the RBM is a useful tool that can assist in improving performance across the board but it is only one ingredient in

\textsuperscript{15} ibid
\textsuperscript{16} Mid-Term Fiscal Policy Review “Arresting inflation-the need for consistent policy measures”; presentation by the Minister of Finance, the Hon. H.M. Murerwa, to the Parliament of Zimbabwe, July 2006; First Half 2006 Monetary Policy Review Statement by Dr. G. Gono Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, July 2006
an overall strategy, and there can be no substitute for creating the enabling environment that will help reverse the current economic and political stalemate in the country. As the Malaysians demonstrated, a creatively crafted communication strategy is an incontrovertible force for engendering popular support, rebuilding domestic and foreign confidence in Government policies and strategies and, ultimately improving the country’s image.

III.2 Review of RBM and the UNDP Preparatory Assistance Programme

The twelve-month Preparatory Assistance Program (PAP), a prelude to the subsequent RBM-Programme of Assistance (POA), had the following objectives:

1. Build overall awareness, appreciation and commitment among relevant Government and non-government stakeholders and players;
2. Set up appropriate physical and human resources infrastructure and systems;
3. Equip players with competence in programme planning, coordination, management and implementation;
4. Provide appropriate systems and structures across relevant Government agencies to support RBM;
5. Implement preparatory actions necessary in budgeting, personnel management, M & E and MIS to facilitate successful implementation of the RBM;

In order to achieve these objectives, PAP activities focused on capacity improvements, institutional and organizational adjustment, introduction of actions on the four pillars of RBM (i.e. performance budgeting, personnel performance, monitoring and evaluation and management information systems including e-Government) and improved service delivery reflected in Quick Wins programmes.

III.3 Institutional Arrangements
The project document details the composition of the following committees required in an RBM system\textsuperscript{17}: Program Policy Steering Committee (PPSC) of high-level policy decision makers; Program Technical Steering Committee (PTSC) responsible for overall operational and technical management; RBM Component Working Committees (CWCs); Agency Program Steering Committee; Programme Management Team (PMT) responsible for day-to-day operations; and Program Management Unit (PMU) as the Secretariat.

Management arrangements appear to have been well constructed, with clearly defined roles, functions and reporting structures that avoid duplication.

**III.4 PAP OUTPUTS AND OUTCOMES**

**III.4.1 Awareness Creation**

The GOZ issued the RBM policy guidance circular in May 2005 (OPC-General Letter No. 6 of 2005) advising stakeholders that RBM had been adopted. As a first task spreading awareness of RBM and its importance in achieving national development goals had to be tackled.

The Review Mission (RM) learned that while the study tours for participants with responsibility in the various RBM components (i.e. RBB, PPS, MIS/M&E) to Malaysia, Singapore and Hong Kong in September 2005 and in June 2006, provided a platform for comprehending and exchanging views about the value of RBM implementation for addressing developmental strategies and economic and financial fundamentals\textsuperscript{18}, greater investment of resources in a more aggressive awareness campaign could have been more beneficial for a wider selection of stakeholders in all sectors of the community (private, public, civil and non-governmental organizations). Nevertheless, a complete set of RBM guidelines and training manuals for capacity building have been made available to trainers and RBM implementing agencies, although some questions have been raised regarding the clarity and simplicity of guidelines.

**III.4.2 Results Based Budgeting (RBB)**

\textsuperscript{17} UNDP Results-Based Management – Preparatory Assistance Programme January-December 2005
\textsuperscript{18} GOZ Study Tours for senior officials in 2006 to Malaysia 3-12 June, Hong Kong 13-15 June
This is the most advanced RBM component and Parliament was advised by the MOF that the 2006 budget would be prepared on this basis. Emphasizing cost-effectiveness in the allocation and utilization of financial resources toward the implementation of achievable and results-oriented projects and programmes the RBB Steering Committee and a Programme Management and Support Unit within the MOF spearhead RBB through planning, coordinating and managing all related performance activities. Treasury Circular Number 2005 issued to all ministries and departments in September 2005 announced Expenditure Targets as the basis for their submissions. On that basis ministries and departments had to produce Work Plans, performance indicators and sign Performance Agreements for which they would be held accountable, only five are yet to comply. A team of Budget Review Officers (BROs) trained in Work and Performance Monitoring Planning are charged with analyzing PAs and departmental work plans to contribute to overall financial performance improvement of ministries and departments.

Two related problems to the roll out of RBB at this juncture are the impact of hyper-inflation and experience of the BROs. Even with the abandonment of incremental budgeting, queries were raised in some quarters regarding the integrity of budgets in a hyper-inflationary environment and whether this had an effect on the apparent delays in submitting the budget for 2007 at this late stage in October 2006. Secondly, it has emerged some of BROs are junior officers lacking appropriate competence and experience needed in developing budgets, one painful reminder of the impact of brain drain on middle management levels.

**III.4.3 Personnel Performance System (PPS)**

Earlier work of the Public Service Commission (PSC) in civil service reform was precursory to the introduction of PPS, with similar goals of improving service delivery in the public sector through a committed and highly motivated workforce. Four modules (Performance Appraisal, Human Resources Development, Human Resources Management and Information and Communication Technology) are integral to effective implementation of the PPS. A Steering Committee and a Programme Management Unit established by the PSC, have responsibility for overall coordination. Guidelines for performance appraisal, separate appraisal forms for Heads of Departments, for members in Band A & B as well as in Band C, D & E, have been widely circulated.
The new appraisal system has been pilot tested in several ministries and departments and an e-enabled customized version is being developed for tracking work distribution and deliverables at individual, unit, section, department, ministry and national levels. Training of Trainers for the implementation of the performance appraisal was completed in August 2006. One concern raised during the mission was that the current forms are longer than those used in the past, more complicated and not user friendly.

III.4.4 Monitoring and Evaluation & Management Information System (M&E/MIS)

The MIS captures information from the M&E system at every level to assist managers and stakeholders to make informed decisions. Activities, outputs and outcomes in this component include M&E templates and manuals for monitoring and reporting on work programmes and the Zimbabwe Integrated Performance Management System (ZIPMas) with three modules (i.e. Programme Planning, Monitoring and Reporting). ZIPMas facilitates structured planning, tracking and performance reporting. A total of 120 focal persons have been trained in the ZIPMas application.

III.4.5 E-Government (e-G)

The e-Government is an enabler and facilitates the overall implantation of RBM. Four beneficiaries of e-G include citizens, the business community, Government employees, and Government agencies. Four e-G services are Government-to-Citizen (G-C), Government-to-Business (G-B), Government-to-Employee (G-E) and Government –to-Government (G-G). The review mission was informed that resources are required for the purchase of computers and the training of relevant staff to ensure that this segment of RBM is not unduly hampered.

III.4.6 Quick Wins

As a concept “Quick Wins” (QW) demonstrate positive results from RBM at the same time inducing speedy buy-in. Phase One covered the Pension Department, and Registrar General’s office and Central Vehicle Registration.
**Pension Department**\(^{19}\): The application process has been re-engineered to reduce delays. Submission of pension application forms through Human Resources Departments in ministries/departments, while the prospective retiree is still employed ought to guarantee payment during the first month of retirement. Efforts are underway to transform the system to become more pro-active. The review mission was informed that the time taken to effect payments has been reduced from 6 months to 45 days. Although there might be slippage in some cases, as the widow mentioned in the footnote. The Pension Office is negotiating with banks that deal with the pensioners to be sensitive to the concerns of retirees and to have special conditions for paying out pensioners.

**Issuance of Passports and Birth Certificates** – The speed with which these documents are issued has improved as a result of reforms undertaken in the respective departments\(^{20}\).

Further QWs have been identified for the second phase that commenced in February 2006:

- **a)** Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) – enhanced revenue collection;
- **b)** Zimbabwe Tourism Authority (ZTA) – improved tourism inflows into Zimbabwe;
- **c)** Cabinet secretariat – setting up of Management Information System;

The QW committee influenced National Economic Recovery Council (NERC) to track the implementation of recommendations and this has started with National Tourism Strategic Marketing Plan under ZTA\(^{21}\) and with the green route facility at border crossings and enhanced signage under ZIMRA. There has been some evidence of success in both areas.

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\(^{19}\) During the visit to the Pension Department the mission met a widow who had traveled from Gokwe to collect her pension payment. This was the third visit in as many years starting in 2003 when she made the original application. In 2004 she was told that she needed an affidavit that was brought in 2005. Returning in 2006 she has been told that her file cannot be located.

\(^{20}\) Progress Report on Quick Wins for 2nd PTSC Meeting – September 2006

\(^{21}\) ibid
Successes demonstrated in the QW projects have clearly demonstrated that careful analysis of systems and processes using carefully developed instruments can lead to discovering new ways of working that can improve the quality of service delivery. What is critical in QWs is commitment to invest resources in undertaking diagnostic activities\textsuperscript{22}.

Quick Wins are selected on the basis of easy and speedy success at minimal cost with high visibility. It could be instructive to aim at implementing a mixture of QWs, some easy and others more difficult. In current Zimbabwean conditions there are public sector entities where QWs are desperately needed such as refuse collection, power cuts, water shortages and the police force.

**III.4.7 Sensitization/Orientation and Training**

Forty senior officials participated in Training of Trainer (ToTs) workshops in June and July 2005, covering all RBM components. These trainers have since carried out extensive downlink training using the cascading methodology August 2005 to September 2006 for all ministries and departments\textsuperscript{23}.

The mission reviewed the participant’s manual in order to determine its adequacy in equipping the would-be trainers with a sound conceptual understanding of RBM. The manual/workbook was detailed and logically structured and the Trainer’s material on CD was of good quality.

The perceptions of some trainees were canvassed by the mission and received comments such as the Trainers were trying hard but training was mechanistic, presentations rigid and rote-like, content and methodology cast in stone as if merely passing on the Malaysian’s messages. Trainers seemed unaware of the uniqueness of the trainees and the circumstances in which they worked with insufficient investment in customizing the content and the methodology to the needs of the trainees.

Trainers themselves acknowledged that although they had grasped key concepts in RBM they lacked first hand exposure to countries where RMB was successfully implemented and had a lot to learn. They

\textsuperscript{22} Detailed documentation is evident in quarterly progress reports and in minutes for Quick Wins meetings

\textsuperscript{23} Training Records from the Program Management Unit being compiled
therefore found themselves restricted in giving meaningful examples to enrich the training sessions. Several trainees pointed out that for RBM training to be taken seriously there is need for a visible and sustainable commitment from the top. Political will and support were among the other factors cited as essential if participants in training workshops are to take training seriously.

The review mission learned that there is no systematic evaluation of the RBM training except through reaction evaluations done at the end workshops. Anecdotal evidence on the impact of training is gathered from the quality of documentation and reports, application of what has been learnt from one workshop to the next and the ability to establish linkages across the workshops covering different aspects of RBM.

III.4.8 Challenges Experienced During the PAP

a) A degree of skepticism is evident in some quarters as some people feel that it will come and go. Understanding what RBM is and what it is not is still a factor. As one observer indicated, “as far as RBM is concerned there are more questions than answers at the political level”. A lot of work needs to be done to enable direct players in RBM to understand this management tool. Some views have even been expressed doubting that the RBM system has been fully grasped even by senior officials such as Permanent Secretaries.

b) Changing (or reconfiguring) the mind-set of civil servants to realize that their core business is serving people is still a time consuming challenge. There is need to shift from a business as usual mental attitude to one that is pro-active. The introduction of RBM and the rollout process during the PAP was accomplished in twelve months. It is difficult to achieve sustainable changes in attitudes in a relatively short time span.

c) Even with the benefit of civil service reform, changing opinions by some client/users is difficult. Traditional perceptions are that the civil service is uncaring and insensitive to the needs of the recipients of the services. Again this requires behaviour change and an effective communication strategy and this has implications for RBM.

d) RBM is a complicated and demanding system, requiring inputs in financial and human terms for learning, absorbing change and demonstrating courage to do things differently. Mastering new concepts and principles, devotedly following unfamiliar and seemingly complex procedures, requires competent and
committed drivers of the process. Efforts to capacitate the civil service faced by high staff turnover as a result of brain drain, either from transfers or resignations, is most challenging for absorbing RBM in Zimbabwe.

e) Although RBM is presumably driven from the Office of the President and Cabinet achieving uniform buy-in among Ministers, Parliamentarians and Commissioners remains challenging. Apparently some of the top managers have not attended sensitization and training workshops\(^{24}\). Individuals find it difficult to buy-in into a concept is not fully understand nor appreciated.

f) Shortage of resources continues to plague the implementation of this initiative, for example in acquiring computers for IT related activities as cited in the Pension Department and the Procurement Board.

g) Introducing a new initiative in hyper-inflationary environment in which budgets rapidly evaporate, sometimes within a month, threaten RBM effectiveness. It may fail to demonstrate results and could easily lose its reputation and credibility before even being fully installed.

h) Multi-faceted capacity building is necessary for RBM to be fully effective and there is a need to capacitate staff on the technical component of their jobs. One observer pointed out that the priority in his department was not RBM training but technical training. He further maintained that technically competent staff in his department would in turn contribute to the training of other colleagues in line ministries.

IV. Lessons Learned and Prospects for RBM Sustainability

IV.1 Enabling Environment critical for RBM

UNDP PAP has certainly ventilated the pros and cons of RBM in Zimbabwe and despite some unknown and uncharted areas the review mission believes that it is an authentic tool for improving the effectiveness of the GOZ in the business of management and operations for delivering services in the areas of budgeting, personnel performance, monitoring and evaluation, MIS and e-Government.

\(^{24}\) Terminal Project Report: Results Based Management Assistance Programme (PAP), May 2005-June 2006
RBM in Zimbabwe is not being introduced in a vacuum. Some ministries and departments were already implementing various systems, procedures and processes that could be easily incorporated into RBM. Indeed, the work of the Public Service Commission on civil service reform over two decades set the stage for the RBM trial as a means of improving performance across the board. So too are applications managed by the MOF in performance budgeting. However, Zimbabwe is currently engulfed in a political and economic crisis that requires urgent strategic decisions and action to create an enabling environment within which the implementation of RBM will achieve its full potential. If those issues are not successfully tackled the adoption of RBM will have very limited impact in this country.

Malaysia’s recovery from its 1997 financial crisis and the successful adoption of RBM made their experience noteworthy for Zimbabwe. Additionally, as Zimbabwe has adopted a “Look East Policy” in the context of south-south solidarity and in the search of new investments, the Malaysian link became opportune. But, it must be remembered that RBM is a tool that cannot replace strategies for economic recovery and political dialogue. Both endeavours – RBM and national recovery strategies – require the same zest, commitment and political will to harness essential synergies.

In adopting the Malaysian model, it must be recognized that each country has a unique history and culture that informs options, choices and decisions. While RBM targets Government ministries, state enterprises and hopefully, the private and NGO sectors in the future, with functions, processes and procedures similar in both countries, it is the indigenization and customization that will ultimately yield optimal results for RBM in Zimbabwe. And that will require commitment at all levels, moreso at the highest level of authority, demonstrable leadership and ownership and the provision of human and financial resources on a sustainable basis.

By establishing the National Security Council, the National Economic Recovery Council and the Technical Committee that supports both, with the President, Vice President and Chief Secretary respectively chairing each, within the framework set out by the NEDPP, Zimbabwe’s approach mirrors that of the Malaysian National Economic Action Council. The latter’s adoption of a consultative and communication strategy that was transparent and inclusive, with meetings involving a wide cross-section of stakeholders, with regular reporting, acknowledging private sector contributions, at the same time utilizing
a network of foreign media, helped guarantee up-to-date and reliable feedback domestically and internationally. That approach, an essential feature of buy-in, a “sense of belonging to the struggle” as it was termed in Malaysia, conveyed to the public at large that its Government could be held accountable for decisions reached with such candour and openness. Government seems to be cautiously venturing along similar paths with NEDPP references to stakeholder participation, public-private sector partnerships and the mention of a Social Contract involving Government, Business and Unions. It is hoped that the stakeholder universe would routinely expand to civil society.

**IV.2 Quick Wins**

It is understood that GOZ intends to maximize “Quick Wins” in service delivery as one means of inducing RBM buy-in. Illustrations have already been mentioned earlier in this report. While these examples are understandable as results from changes in those processes are easily discerned, the introduction of measurable indicators against preset targets would lend greater credibility to the outcomes, particularly with respect to the monitoring and evaluation dimension of RBM. Introduction of client satisfaction surveys should become routine.

As GOZ plans to adopt an across the board approach in introducing RBM throughout all ministries and state enterprises, every Government entity should be required to establish measurable indicators and targets, similar to the work plans and performance contracts between line ministries and the MOF, that would ensure that its work plans identify potential “Quick Wins”. If this could become a reality it could be the “tipping point” for engendering the full value of RBM throughout the country.

**IV.3 Training**

Training has already been recognized as crucial to the successful implementation and sustainability of RBM. Zimbabwe has been well served by an educational system that in the early years of independence sought to reverse the inequities of its colonial past and universal primary education was well within its grasp providing a basis for educational advance and eradication of literacy. However, a number of challenges such as the brain drain, rural-urban drift, gender inequalities and resource constraints, are hurdles yet to be overcome.

The forty Zimbabwean Trainer-of-Trainers exposed to a two week course at Victoria Falls and then let loose on their colleagues
throughout the Government to provide three-day training on RBM, twenty in Harare and the remainder in the rural provinces, should be congratulated as courageous national pioneers for taking on such a weighty assignment on fairly short notice. Selection of the original cadre based on seniority, some pedagogical exposure and availability for release, allowing for variation in individual capabilities in dealing with an entirely new subject, it seems like a leap of faith to expect these new Trainer-of-Trainees to be able to impart with creativity the skills needed to absorb and transmit a customized RBM for Zimbabwe. It is no wonder that some reports received by this review mission suggested that the training exposure was less than satisfactory, more rote-like than flexible. Added to this is the ever-depleting brain drain that will undoubtedly affect these new trainers as well.

GOZ intention to explore the suitability of the Zimbabwe Institute for Public Administration (ZIPAM) as the anchor for RBM training is reassuring and coincides RBM Programme of Assistance (POA), due to commence in January 2007. It seems to this mission as a more valuable and sustainable approach than continued training on a piecemeal basis ministry to ministry. A physical facility and institutional structure established by an Act of Parliament responsible for civil service training, with functioning links to the public and private sectors and academia, is struggling, resource starved, underutilized and much maligned by potential clients. This degree of malaise would certainly be overcome if ZIPAM were engaged to assume full responsibility for RBM training, including design that takes account of the need for customization, using its access to academia and the private sector, with predictable funding, it could present a far more cost-effective and sustainable approach for the inculcation of RBM. The Malaysian team that will be involved in supporting implementation of RBM in this country would need to be informed that ZIPAM is the Government’s choice institution for leading targeted training on RBM and that would require specific collaboration.

Another approach to training would focus on curriculum modification at tertiary, and even secondary, levels, already foreseen as one of the objectives in the POA. Stated as the creation and inculcation of an RBM value system among new entrants into the job market through the introduction of RBM as a multi-disciplinary subject in all tertiary institutions in the country, this approach could be transformational. This review mission takes the position that the RBM value system presents an opportunity for change with measurable outcomes and could in fact be introduced at an earlier stage in the education of Zimbabweans. If at the secondary level for instance, teachers were
oriented to accept that their responsibility was not only to prepare students for passing examinations but rather for preparing them for more productive and effective lives as contributors to building a nation and generating consensus around sound values, the curriculum at the secondary level could draw on the RBM performance-oriented techniques. Young individuals could be inspired to grander goals to become more responsible citizens.

The Malaysian team of consultants has been inspiring in its ability to bring together individuals with precise RBM skills and experience on the basis of its successful application in their country. The real test will be in their ability to pass on those skills to Zimbabwe in a realistic time frame sensitive to the national leadership and ownership imperatives. As is currently planned for the POA, a Malaysian will occupy the position of Chief Technical Adviser and a number of international advisers will also be from Malaysia, although geographical diversity among team members could be beneficial.

In terms of sustainability it is critical that there is a matching Zimbabwean team assigned on a fulltime basis at the project level, with the understanding that the senior member of that team assumes lead responsibility in a pre-agreed timeframe, perhaps one year, even before the departure of the Malaysians, thereby enhancing hands-on leadership and ownership.

V. Conclusions

RBM has been successfully tested and is utilized in many countries around the world. As a proven authentic tool for enhancing public and private sector efficiency and effectiveness in the way services are delivered to their clients, RBM can bring added value to Government policies and programmes. But RBM should not be taken as a replacement for Governments’ strategic or policy frameworks, although it would clearly help to improve the implementation of those frameworks.

By overcoming numerous impediments through effective resource planning and utilization, improved human resources management and training, MIS application, M&E that measures performance and progress and e-Government, Zimbabwe, in concert with different partners, is well positioned to adopt RBM as a transformational tool.
In recent years the impact of Zimbabwe’s policy frameworks has been modest, undermined by natural disasters, absence of a dialogue process that could build consensus around a national vision, a crippling decline in economic performance and perennial resource constraints. While resources from the UN development system are limited, support for Government development priorities is unquestionable and, as has been consistently demonstrated, there is a clear willingness to tackle complex and controversial issues.

Government investment in introducing and sustaining RBM is likely to be quite sizable\textsuperscript{25} and while the return on this investment through efficiencies, effectiveness and containment of misallocation of funds will be equally valuable, the need for an injection of resources to bolster this initiative is clearly evident. Some donor entities have been active in the past providing RBM training and there could be a revival of interest under certain circumstances. As Government reaches out and broadens the Zimbabwean stakeholder base, encouraging for example the ecumenical initiative, encouraging a consensus building national dialogue in search of a “shared vision” as called for in the NEDPP, exploratory feelers to some members of the donor community may in fact yield positive responses. The national dialogue will undoubtedly establish the platform for fair and just solutions with the international community.

**VI. Recommendations**

**VI.1 Dialogue** – utilizing the momentum and widespread expectations emanating from the innovative and far-reaching policies contained in the National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP), Government should signal a willingness and readiness to launch and sustain a countrywide dialogue process to build consensus around a National Vision, involving the private sector, civil society, the church and academia. Initiatives already underway in some quarters should be encouraged, stimulating the release of national energy and collective will to tackle resolutely the current economic stalemate thereby taking advantage of the enabling environment within which RBM could flourish and be sustained.

**VI.2 Buy-in** – is an essential feature for the inculcation of RBM into the new impetus of Zimbabwe’s public-private sector

\textsuperscript{25} Government contribution for the one-year Preparatory Assistance Project in current ZIMB $ 10,512,125 and estimated for the three-year Programme of Assistance at ZIMB $ 20 million plus. GOZ also carries an extensive training programme for rollout of RBM distributed in various ministries and departments.
partnership arrangements. As a first step there needs to be demonstrable commitment at the highest political levels in the country (President, Politbureau, Cabinet, Parliament), Permanent Secretaries as Accounting Officers of the Government, CEOs of state enterprises, the Governor of the Reserve Bank and Captains of Industry. This level of agreement should be accompanied by issuance of appropriate guidelines and instructions, monitoring of progress, information and publicity campaigns and commitment of resources to buttress the rollout and maintenance of RBM.

VI.3 Quick Wins – are invaluable and persuasive in gaining support for RBM throughout the civil service and with the public at large. By selection of agencies that serve the public directly (pensions, vehicle registration, issuance of birth and death certificate and passports) improved service delivery is readily recognized. Every Ministry, Department and State Enterprise should be required to identify within their work programmes submitted to the MOF and reflected in their Performance Agreement, which product or service will reflect improved delivery and in what timeframe. As the public faces for example, problems of refuse collection, interrupted electricity supply, water shortages and claims of arbitrary police action, improvements in the relevant Government department services would go a long way in developing credibility in commitment across the board. Admittedly, some of these services are more complex but by systematic planning and reporting on these areas the impact as an eventual “Quick Win” would be salutary.

VI.4 Resource Mobilization – in a period of resource constraints and budgets eroded by hyper-inflation, the Government must be commended on the efforts it is making to adapt RBM to the Zimbabwean environment. Even though resources are scarce, target institutions must be encouraged to plan and execute with due diligence thereby effecting savings through efficiencies. Meanwhile GOZ needs to continue in its search for new investment partners while not discarding traditional donors.
VI.5 Training – is the centre-piece of integrating RBM in the Zimbabwean public sector culture and sustainability depends on how effective is customization and resources generated to expand training activities to meet new and evolving needs. Government should ensure orientation and training at senior levels, including taking the training to Cabinet to capture the attention of Ministers who have not as yet participated in any RBM training programmes.

ZIPAM should be officially designated as the RBM training institution and become involved in the design, organization and delivery of training. Resources should be sought to facilitate this important shift, including exploration with donor partners.

GOZ should examine how best to adjust curricula at tertiary and secondary levels to introduce the RBM value system as a component in the education process.

VI.6 Zimbabwean leadership of RBM – is crucial for the successful incorporation of RBM. Leadership at the highest political level including the President, Politbureau, Cabinet, Parliament, CEOs of State Enterprises, Permanent Secretaries and the Governor of the Reserve Bank need to publicly demonstrate their commitment in appropriate ways. Leadership of the RBM project implementation team is one clear guarantee of ownership. The Zimbabwean management team must be appointed on a full-time basis at the earliest stage establishing a timeframe for their assuming leadership of all aspects of the project, for example within twelve months, with Malaysian international experts designated as their advisers.

VI.7 Communication Strategy – if successful will serve to mobilize support across all levels of society ensuring buy-in of Government initiatives including RBM. The strategy should be constructed on the basis of clear, reliable and frequent messages anchored on policies emanating from widespread stakeholder consultations, transparency and accountability at all levels of decision-making, giving assurances that the entire population regardless of ethnic, religious and financial endowment is entitled to share in the accomplishments of the nation. This is the environment within which RBM will become an integral part of a culture of openness and contribute to the development of the nation.